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Henson: The Portland Case

COMMENTARY
THE PORTLAND CASE
Ray D. Henson*
r

E Portlandcase, to give In re Portland Newspaper Publishing
.LCo.1 its familiar name, is an excellent example of the malaise
infecting our bankruptcy system. Here some creditors lent money on
the security of assigned accounts receivable. Naturally these accounts
changed constantly. In broad terms, because the security interests were
perfected more than four months before bankruptcy and the accounts
arose within the four-month period, the security interests were said to
be preferential under section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.
While the referee's opinion was long, it is difficult in some cases and
impossible in others to find what would appear to be essential facts.
There is, however, a lengthy discussion of the "legal" theory involved.
Because the case is most peculiar on its facts, such as they are, and it
did not involve ordinary commercial accounts financing, it would seem
more profitable to discuss the usual kind of accounts financing in the
context of the referee's legal analysis.
Suppose we have a financer willing to lend $100,000 for five years
against the accounts then existing and thereafter arising in the operation of an ordinary retail store. The accounts are not to fall below
$125,000, and it will be an event of default under the loan agreement
if they do. Subject to the occurrence of an event of default, the lender
is willing for the debtor to exercise dominion over the accounts, to
* Member of Illinois Bar. B.S., University of Illinois, 1947; LL., 1949.

1 No. B 64-3282, D. Ore., Feb. 9, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Portland]. The opinion in
ful text is printed in 4 CCH INst. Cram. GumE
98483 (1966) and 3 UCC REP. SEay. 194
(1966). In his opinion Referee Snedecor makes a number of references to Henson,
"Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLuM. L. REv. 232 (1965). While
I have no pride of authorship, I do have a firm belief in the fundamental rightness of
the basic ideas contained in that article and consequently have accepted the invitation

of the editors of the GEoRGIA LAw REvimw to make this "reply" to Referee Snedecor.
Although I disagree with substantially every legal point in the Referees Portland opinion-and, because of the importance of the issues involved, have no hesitation in saying
so, it is only fair to state that Referee Snedecor has a high reputation in bankruptcy
circles, which I believe to be deserved by long years of devoted service. I only regret
that he did not bring to the Portland case the perception he has shovm in another
highy important area in Snedecor, Why So Many Bankruptcies in Oregon?, 40 RE,. J.
78 (1966). In any event, this comment is related only to Rose City Development Company, Inc.,'s claim in the Portland case, or, more accurately, to the issues raised by
accounts financing in a bankruptcy context.
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make collections, to accept returned goods and adjust accounts, and
to carry on ordinary business transactions. Interest will be paid quarterly on the loan, but no principal will be repaid until the loan matures
at the end of five years unless an event of default occurs and maturity
is accelerated. A financing statement claiming a security interest in
"accounts ' 2 is properly filed. Three years after the security interest
is perfected the debtor goes into bankruptcy. There are no competing
security interests. The accounts subject to the security interest have
never fallen below $125,000,3 and the accounts on hand at bankruptcy
have all arisen within four months of bankruptcy. Is the security
interest entitled to recognition and enforcement in bankruptcy?
Presumably the referee in the Portlandcase would find this security
interest a preference and therefore unenforceable in bankruptcy. (If so,
he would have on his side a considerable number of referees and bankruptcy specialists, both practicing and academic.) 4 The reason, subject
to some elaboration, would be that the relation back of the security
interest in after-acquired property provided by the Uniform Commercial Code will not be recognized in bankruptcy.
2 That "Accounts" is an adequate description for all accounts covered by the security
agreement which arise during the period the financing statement is effective cannot be
open to reasonable doubt. See In re Platt, 4 CCH INsT. CRED. GUIDE
98448 (E.D. Pa.)
(in bankruptcy), vacated on other grounds, 4 CCH INST. CR_. GUIDE
98323 (E.D. Pa.
1966); National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
For an intimation to the contrary, however, see Portland, 4 CCH INST. CRED. GUIDE
98483 at 89071 (1966). The Code adopts a system of notice filing, and anyone fluent
in the English language would know that a filed financing statement covering "Accounts"
could include all present and future accounts arising within the effective period of the
filing; no other meaning is sensible. See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110 [hereinafter
cited as U.C.C.] (All section references not otherwise identified are to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text.)
a It may be pointed out, and perhaps it should be emphasized, that the collateral In
Portlanddid not fall below the amount of the loan at any time during the four months
preceding bankruptcy. See Exhibit E attached to Stipulation admitted as Exhibit 39 on
May 27, 1966, in the record of evidence, In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., No.
B 64-3282, D. Ore., Feb. 9, 1966.
4 It is difficult for me to see why certain academic bankruptcy specialists continually
favor unsecuring every secured loan by any interpretation of any applicable statute
that will achieve that end. Perhaps it is in part an effort to infuse a certain aura of
esoterica into a rather commonplace part of the law. It serves no social purpose to
upset secured credit transactions, when the inevitable result is simply more expensive
credit, for secured credit there must be to keep our economy moving; some necessitous
borrowers just cannot get unsecured loans. It serves no purpose of any kind to engage
in excessive legalisms in order to thwart the will of Congress and the legislatures of
almost every state. To engage in such is lacking in justification when the Commercial Code
in no way contravenes the Bankruptcy Act or the policy underlying it.
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It is dear that the hypothesized transaction meets the requirements
of the Code for a perfected, enforceable security interest. That is, the
security interest attached when the parties made their agreement,
the debtor had rights in the collateral, and the secured party advanced
funds; 5 it was perfected by filing.0 The security interest was not impaired by the secured party's failure to exercise any dominion over the
collateral,7 and the Code recognizes a continuing security interest in
changing collateral. 8
In what circumstances may a valid security interest be denied enforcement as a preference? Eight elements must co-exist before a preference
exists: there must be (1) a transfer (by way of security) of (2) the debtor's
property (3) to a creditor (4)made by the debtor while insolvent (5)
within four months of bankruptcy (6) on account of an antecedent debt
(7) with the effect of enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class, and
(8) the creditor must have had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent when the transfer was made.10
The pro-Bankruptcy Act (and anti-Code) argument usually takes the
position that as each new account arises, it is a new transfer when that
account becomes subject to the pre-existing security agreement, and,
subject to other elements of a preference being found to be present,
accounts arising within four months of bankruptcy are voidable
preferences." To some extent this argument relies on the Code's stipula5 See U.C.C. § 9-204(l).
6 See U.C.C. § 9-302(1).
7 See U.C.C. § 9-205. This

section may be said to repeal the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
268 U.S. 853 (1925); at all events it eliminates any possible basis for the rule. According
to Referee Snedecor, this "section may serve to displace" this rule. See Portland,4 CCH
INSr. Cmm. GUME
98483 at 89072 (1966). (Emphasis added.) That it does displace the
rule is beyond question, for the Supreme Court in Benedict merely purported to state
a rule of New York law, which many states have never recognized or have abolished by
statute.
8 See U.C.C. §§ 9-204(3), (4).
9 Bankruptcy Act. § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1964).
10 Id. § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1964). The basic problem which the preference provisions

of the Bankruptcy Act were designed to meet is the situation where a creditor senses impending doom and grasps security to which he was not previously entitled, thereby diminishing the bankrupts estate to the detriment of other creditors. This is not the kind of
problem involved in the Portland case.
11 These critics admit, as does Referee Snedecor, that the parties could reach exactly
the same result provided by the Code by the more expensive and laborious means of
revolving credit.

Admittedly if Rose City had retained in its agreement the policing provisions...
and had insisted upon their observance, it might have avoided the preference chal-
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tion that a debtor has no rights in an account until it comes into existence 2-- a provision which could easily be dropped from the Codeand of course a security interest cannot attach (or be perfected) before
the debtor has rights in the collateral. 13 This is a perfect example of
lenge. Requirements such as these are insisted upon by sophisticated lenders. They
require that all checks, drafts, cash and other remittances in part or full payment
of any collateral be deposited in a cash collateral account over which the secured

party alone shall have power of withdrawal .... It is usually agreed that once each
week the secured party will apply the whole or any part of the collected funds In
the cash collateral account against the principal or interest of the advances made

against the collateral, and new loans similarly are made upon the assignment of
new accounts. This revolving credit arrangement enables the secured creditor to
keep his financial finger on the business pulse of the debtor. Thus a sound and

healthy business relationship may be maintained between creditor and debtor.
Portland, 4 CCH INsT. Cpm. GUIDE

98483 at 89071 (1966). It requires no intellectual

sophistication or legal legerdemain to see that where the debtor is allowed to retain
collections instead of paying them over to the secured party, the secured party is constantly giving new value to the debtor, just as much as if he had taken the money with
one hand and given it back with the other. As old accounts are paid down, collateral
is released, and new accounts come under the security agreement for new value. Section
9-108 says no more than this. To the argument that these substitutions must be strictly
"contemporaneous," it may be said that the concept is in fact a practical impossibility,
as those who think in terms of events must realize and as those who do not go behind
shibboleths will not. The courts have not been so impractical as the Code's critics.

See Henson, supra note 1, at 251.
98483, at 89076
12 U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(d). See Portland, 4 CCH INST. CRED. GUIDE
(1966).
13 U.C.C. §§ 9-204(1), 9-303(1). Professor King seems to feel that these sections create
the problem, basically because of the concept of attachment. See King, Section 9-108 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It Insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a
Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1117 (1966). While the concept of attachment
is perhaps not an essential one, neither is it new. Under our old chattel mortgage law, for
example, we could have had a mortgage "valid between the parties'--i.e., it had "at.
tached"--but invalid as to third parties because there was no recording-i.e., It was not
"perfected." The Code provisions at issue here present no difficulty unless one conceptualizes secured transactions in terms of specific mortgages of specific things. To read the
Code as Professor King and other pro-bankruptcy specialists do, means that accounts and
inventory cannot be financed without being vulnerable in bankruptcy unless a revolving
credit plan is established; this attitude is insupportable as a social policy or as a legal
policy. Professor King suggests that the concept of attachment could be eliminated from
the concept of perfection so that "the security interest in after-acquired property could
be considered perfected at the time the financing transaction and filing occur without any
need to wait for the debtor to acquire the property. There would then be no problem
with the section 60(a) four-month period or antecedent debt element." King, supra at 1132.
It seems to me that this would unleash a new barrage of complaints about the Code
stating a rule contrary to fact-that is, how can you have today a perfected security interest
in an account that may arise next year?-although this concept does have some case
support.
Leaving metaphysics to one side, the Code handles the conceptual problem satisfac-
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the "mortgage mentality" at work; this is the dosed mind that can conceive of no security interest more modern than the old-fashioned real
estate mortgage, preferably covering only dirt.
The simple answer to this so-called problem is in section 9-108 which
provides:
Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation,
releases a perfected security interest, or otherwise gives new value
which is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired
property his security interest in the after-acquired collateral shall
be deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for an
antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral
either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of
purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given.
It was unfortunate draftsmanship to include the word "deemed" in
this provision. It provides a peg on which to hang the standard objection that this provision is contrary to fact. This provision simply recognizes the standard bankruptcy doctrine that there is no preference when
new property is substituted for other property in a secured transaction.' 4 The security interest continues and relates back to the original
perfection. There is no objection whatsoever to this relation back.
This kind of relation back was not condemned-it was not even
involved-in Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder,15 a case which seems to
be frequently mis-cited in writings about the Code and the Bankruptcy
Act. The Klauder case involved a perfectly simple collision between an
accounts receivable financer and a trustee in bankruptcy, at a time when
torily if one accepts certain basic premises. There is no solution to these problems
unless one is willing to accept the necessity of the kind of financing we are concerned
with and the statutory provisions which now make it feasible, or any other provisions
which may later be used. Any language is capable of more than one interpretation.
14 Where collateral, such as inventory or accounts, is constantly changing, it seems
to me that the collateral can be analogized to, e.g., the Mississippi River. See Henson,
supra note 1, at 233-34. In the ordinary usage of English, we think we know what we
mean when we say, "Mississippi River," even though that river is not the same at any
two moments in time. Similarly, when we speak of inventory or accounts of a named
debtor we think we know what we are talking about even though that collateral is
constantly changing, in tangible or intangible ways. When the collateral changes, we
trace the original security interest into the proceeds back into substituted collateral,
and so on, so that the security interest is continuous and continuously perfected. See
U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This is not a new concept. See Henson, supra note 1, at 248-52.
15 318 U.S. 434 (1943). For an example of the mis-citing of Klauder see Portland, 4
CCH INsT. Cpm. GUIDE 98483, at 89075-77 (1966).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

5

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 5

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 1:257

section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act deemed a transfer to take place when
no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could have
acquired rights in the property superior to the transferee. Under
Pennsylvania law at that time, an assignee of accounts was required to
notify the account debtor, in order to prevail against a subsequent good
faith assignee who had given such notice. If no notice was given, and
none was in this case, then the transfer was clearly vulnerable under the
Bankruptcy Act. Of course, the state law was changed to make the
assignment effective when noted on the assignor's books,10 and the
Bankruptcy Act was subsequently amended to incorporate a lien
creditor test in place of the bona fide purchaser test. 17 What was apparently disturbing the Klauder court was secret liens,' 8 which are
impossible under the Code.
In cases decided before the Code was ever dreamed of, as well as in
cases arising since it has been effective, courts have recognized continuing security interests covering after-acquired collateral, without
even discussing the preference question, when the secured transactions
were carried out in accordance with applicable law. Two pre-Code
cases' 9 were dismissed by the Portlandreferee with the observation that
the facts did not disclose that the property in issue was acquired within
four months of bankruptcy. 20 This is true, but on the other hand,
nothing indicated that it was not acquired within four months of
bankruptcy; and, particularly when we are dealing with inventory, it
would appear only common sense to assume that some inventory was
received within four months of bankruptcy. A certain number of
changing-collateral cases are not treated as preference cases, but this
does not mean that the issue could not have been raised; it merely
indicates that it was not raised. 21 The cases may be taken to be ambiguous on the point, or they may be taken to support the proposition that
16 See Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder, supra note 15 at 436, n.6.

17 See, e.g., MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 HAiv. L. REv. 1390 (1950); Kupfcr,
The Recent Amendment of Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act, 24 REF. J. 86 (1950).
18 See Corn Exchange Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 passim (1943). This same problem
of secret liens was important in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
19 Mason v. Citizens' Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 71 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1934); Joe Heaston
Tractor & Implement Co. v. Claussen, 59 N.M. 486, 287 P.2d 57 (1955).
98483, at 89078 (1966). For a different version
20 Portland,4 CCH INst. CRED. GUIDE
of what these cases involved, see Henson, supra note 1, at 250-51.

21 While referees or judges are responsible for what they decide and are entitled to
the ensuing praise or blame, it must be remembered that some cases are argued and
briefed inadequately by counsel; the issues raised may be a matter of chance; and the
fact situations often leave much to be desired.
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at least some bankruptcy courts see it as their duty to enforce security
interests in accordance with the state law creating them.
Three Code cases have involved collateral which surely must have
changed within four months of bankruptcy, and yet the security interest
was properly upheld with no question of a preference being raised:
In re Goodfriend,22 In re United Thrift Stores, Inc.,2 and In re Plait.2
The first two cases involved inventory and the third involved inventory
and accounts. All were in bankruptcy. In the first two cases the referees
were reversed by the district court, while in the third, the opinion was
by Referee Hiller, who is generally and rightly recognized as the foremost Code authority among our referees. Interestingly enough, in the
Platt case Referee Hiller explicitly enforced section 9-501(5) of the
Code, which states that when the secured party reduces its claim to
judgment the lien of the levy relates back to the date the security
interest was perfected. This, of course, is an implicit enforcement of
section 9-108.25
If any reasonable reconciliation of section 9-108 of the Code and section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act can be made, then of course there is no
conflict between the two unless somebody wishes to make one. With
two possible alternatives, it seems strange that some referees prefer to
find invalid, in bankruptcy, a provision in an act sponsored by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, especially when that act has been passed by the
legislatures of 47 states, by Congress for the District of Columbia, and
by the Virgin Islands. Is this attitude tolerable? It is here submitted
that it is not.
It is not the two statutes which are in conflict but rather a modern
statute which meets the needs of the modem world versus the antisecured transaction attitude of some referees and bankruptcy specialists.
Probably not one bankruptcy case on review or appeal has ultimately
been decided adversely to the intentions of the Code's sponsors, but
reviews and appeals are expensive and time-consuming. They would
also be needless if all referees would follow the plain provisions of the
Code.
We can find exemplified in the Portland case the attitude that the
98977 (1964).
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d 11 (1966).
98448 (1966), vacated on other grounds, 4 CCH N.sr. CL.
24 4 CCH INst. Caum. GumE
98323 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
GuIE
25 The lien of the levy related back approximately four years. The collateral, being
inventory and accounts, was constantly changing during this period.
22 4 CCH INsT. Cpm. GuME
23
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Code simply must not be upheld because its provisions make legitimate
secured transactions invulnerable.
According to these Code sections a merchant by a simple signed
agreement, regardless of form, may create a general floating lien
for present and future advances on inventory and accounts receivable including future acquisitions. With such an agreement in
existence the secured party may leave the merchant in complete
control of his business and funds and yet be protected against the
claims of other creditors, except purchase money security interests,
by filing.., a financing statement .... There is no requirement
that it contain any information concerning the limit of the credit
to be extended, the amounts advanced or to be advanced or the
terms of payment. 26
Admittedly the referee has grasped the idea of just what the Code
does, although it would not have been so shocking to him, perhaps, if
he had given some thought to the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
Unless the financing statement shows a maturity date of the
obligation secured, it remains effective for the five years as notice
to the world that the secured party may have a floating lien on the
merchant's inventory and receivables. All other creditors must
carry the burden of ascertaining from time to time the status of
his security interests .... It would appear that the secured party is
not concerned over the amount of unsecured credit extended to
the debtor.27
It is not immediately obvious why "all other creditors" need to
"carry the burden of ascertaining" the limits of the security interest
involved, since they need not become creditors at all. But if they do,
they are creditors with notice. Since the secured party has given public
notice of his interest, surely there is no reason for him to be concerned
with the amount of unsecured credit extended to his debtor-at least
from a legal point of view; from the viewpoint of his interest in seeing the business continue in operation, his concern might be very real.
26 Portland, 4 CCH INST. CR D. GUIDE
98483, at 89072 (1966). The kind of transaction condemned by the referee was found not to be fraudulent as to creditors who had
notice of the financing of inventory because of public recording and who, therefore,

must be held to assume a risk at their peril in Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U.S. 266 (1891).
This old case is cited merely to show that some current ideas have respectable antecedents. There is, however, no reason why current commercial law should be saddled
with commercial concepts of an agrarian economy of the last century, when such con.
cepts do not accord with modem legislation and the needs of a modern society.
27 Portland, supra note 26 at 89073.
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The old-fashioned method of operating a business on the
strength of equity capital and unsecured bank credit based upon
the financial integrity of the debtor seems to be giving way to the
modem trend of financing business operations in reliance upon
a floating lien on current assets with little or no regard for equity
capital. Added to this is the more recent development of leasing,
instead of owning, plant and equipment. These methods leave
the daily suppliers and employees in a perilous position. The
instant case furnishes a dramatic illustration in which the priority
labor claims amount to nearly $43,000. Employees furnished the
labor to publish and deliver the newspapers that gave rise to the
receivables in controversy. The moneys advanced by the creditors
claiming security long since had been dissipated in operating losses.
If these floating liens are valid, the wage claimants may receive
not more than fifteen per cent on their claims out of the free
assets.P
This is the nub of the case. These transactions must be found to be
invalid so that the erstwhile employees may get more money. But put
in terms of a social problem, it is not quite so simple in the Portland
case. The wage claimants were strikers who started the defunct newspaper in competition with their former employers, while Rose City
Development Company, Inc., the principal Code secured party involved, happened to be a corporation formed by 88 labor unions to
provide a building for the strikers to use. Moreover, part of the funds
Rose City had lent on a secured basis perhaps went to pay the strikersemployees whose work generated the accounts, which secured the
capital that may have paid the workers. Which came first, the chicken
or the 1egg? And why should financing patterns authorized by statute
have to meet the personal approval of a referee in bankruptcy?
Ultimately the referee found he was "reminded of Hamlet's plaintive lines:
The time (law) is out of joint; 0 cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it rightl
Nay, come; let's go together."29
Any comment on this adulterated quotation would be superfluous.
It is demonstfable that if every secured transaction were invalidated
in bankruptcy and the secured parties became general creditors, it
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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would make very little financial difference to general creditors in the
average case.30 (It would make a considerable difference to the secured
parties involved, of course.) However, it does seem reasonable that such
a result should be by act of Congress rather than by the whim of a
referee.
Billions of dollars are outstanding in loans against accounts, and
these loans are both legal and necessary. It was undoubtedly loans by
friendly persons which kept the Portland newspaper going as long as it
did. That some security was necessary to obtain the loans is self-evident.
The debtor in Portland could never have qualified for an unsecured
bank loan, which the referee thought a desirable business practice; nor
could the debtor have acquired a place to publish the paper free and
clear of mortgage debt, which the referee also approved, as a cushion
for claims. Times have changed and so have social policies; 8 1 so has the
law.
Because bankruptcy courts provide the ultimate test for many secured transactions, it is very important that referees be attuned to the
law as it is and that they interpret it properly, whatever their personal
preferences may be. If the antipathy of so many referees toward secured
transactions continues to result in their invalidation, until review or
appeal brings the just result, then the referee system as we know it
must be re-examined 32 and perhaps abolished.
30 See Henson, supra note 1, at 253.
31 There is a concomitant problem at the other end of the scale. A considerable number

of referees are failing the lowest economic stratum of our society, which needs protection the most, by an antipathy toward the use of Chapter XIII. Even though Chapter
XIII is widely used in some sections of the country, it is not used, except on rare occasions, in many districts. While no one wants to encourage the payment of idebts to
unscrupulous merchants and purveyors of unnecessary services, it should be readily
apparent that if ignorant consumers have gone through perhaps needless bankruptcies
they can be trapped a minute later under the heavy vise of the credit laws in some
states and they can have no more such relief for six years, which gives creditors a field
day. The importance of this problem can scarcely be over-estimated. Some consumers
need to be saved from themselves, and the referees could help a great deal in this area.
The reasons given for opposing the more frequent use of Chapter XIII are difficult to
fathom and impossible to accept. Perhaps an old Moroccan saying illustrates the problem.
You tell me you are going to Fez.
Now, if you say you are going to Fez,
That means you are not going.
But I happen to know that you are going to Fez.
Why have you lied to me, you who are my friend?
Quoted in BowLr.s, TnE SpisR_'s HousE 55 (1955).
32 The ever-rising cost of bankruptcy administration is in itself a problem of the first
magnitude that demands corrective action. See Henson, supra note 1, at 253.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/5

10

Henson: The Portland Case

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Published Four Times a Year by Law
Students of the University of Georgia.

EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief
JAMEs A. BRAc.

III

Executive Editor
MARIA B. CAmPBELL

Decisions Editor

Articles Editors
JOHN L
WVILLMI

D.EaNs D. IVA=.;

CROMARTIE, JR.
T. JOHNSON

Notes Editor

Research and
Projects Editor

L. DAviD W iSON, I

ALmmT C. RuEmA'N, HI
C. Tnoi-tAs HucciNs
RorERT F. NfAno.N, JR.
JANtEs M. NEY
DALE M. ScnwAnnz
JOHN T. SRAuss
JouN M. TAmr
HowARD E. TuR:NER

RAY L. ALLSoN

JoHN V. BURCH
H. BoYcE CONNELL,
CHESntE

JR.

C. DAVENPOrr

WAYNE T. ELLoTr
MA&GE FEILD

LOWELL S. Fnm
JAMES WI MERLY

BUSINESS BOARD
Business Manager

Executive Secretary

IWILL4M C. TALMADx

JUDY HARRS
MARS.

Assistant Business
Manager
RoNAWD Rocm

Citations conform with A Uniform System of Citation (10th Ed. 1958), published by
the Harvard Law Review Association for the Columbia, Harvard, and University of

Pennsylvania Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

11

